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China’s Engagement-Oriented Strategy Towards North Korea: Achievements 
and Limitations 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of 
mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented 
strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate 
economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009-12) facilitated North Korean 
convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted 
over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has 
refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these 
diverging results and their implications for China‟s strategy towards North Korea. 
Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input 
reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political 
consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of 
stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime‟s pursuit of WMDs as the 
basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits 
of China‟s strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea‟s WMD 
potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by 
crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China‟s 
strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South 
Korea.  
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Unstable North Korea (weak economy, a regime in pursuit of WMDs,1) has posed a 
serious challenge to the security of Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. 
Vulnerable to disturbances on the Korean Peninsula, neighbouring China2 acts as 
North Korea‟s principal political and economic benefactor. How to stabilise North 
Korea (preventing economic collapse while restraining its WMD development) 
constitutes a vital issue for Chinese and regional security. It impacts directly on 
China‟s pursuit of „peaceful rise‟ and „responsible power status‟. The official Chinese 
government perspective is that China‟s basic policy of keeping open the diplomatic 
and economic channels, interspersed with criticism and moderate sanctions in 
response to WMD violations, represents the best policy mix for transforming North 
Korea in a more benign direction. 
 
In this article, I will illustrate and explain the double-edged effects of China‟s 
engagement-oriented strategy. I will show how intensified Chinese economic 
engagement (2009-12) has facilitated convergence with China‟s aim of economic 
reform. Economic progress, however, has not led to WMD restraint (especially since 
2013). The discrepancy has arisen because Chinese economic input reinforces the 
domestic political consolidation of the new hereditary regime but that regime rejects 
stable dependence on China. Instead, it pursues the development of WMDs as the 
basis of security and diplomatic diversification. Contrary to China‟s expectations, it 
believes in the complementarity of economic development and WMD development 
(„line of parallel development‟). China is left with a dilemma. Its economic input is 
involuntarily empowering North Korea‟s WMD programme by taking the sting out of 
international sanctions. Meanwhile the US responds by reinforcing its military 
presence in the region, to the detriment of China‟s strategic position. Despite these 
drawbacks, the uncertainties associated with crippling sanctions and US strategic 
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intentions are likely to keep China wedded to the tested but imperfect strategy of 
moderate sanction without totally abandoning North Korea.   
 
 
Formation of China’s strategic approach 
 
North Korea became a major focus of the Chinese policy community in 2009 when it 
withdrew from the Chinese-hosted Six-Party Talks (SPT) on denuclearisation (April 
2009) and conducted its second nuclear test (May 2009). China has consistently 
restated its commitment to peaceful ends and means, namely „denuclearisation‟, 
„peace and stability‟ and „dialogue and negotiation‟ through revival of the stalled SPT 
as the forum for comprehensive settlement. This line was articulated in September 
2009, soon after North Korea‟s second nuclear test (MOFA 2009). Despite the 
advance of North Korea‟s WMDs programme (three more nuclear tests in 2013 and 
2016 and scores of rocket tests), China has reaffirmed this position, most recently at 
the Munich Security Conference (February 2017). Gong (2009: 113-7) has 
characterised China‟s strategy towards the North Korean WMD issue as being 
guided by the principles of „participation, balance and stability‟. „Participation‟ means 
patient resolution within a multilateral framework that includes China. „Balance‟ 
means friendly Chinese relations with both Koreas and coordination with the US. 
„Stability‟ means preservation of peace, including avoidance of military measures to 
enforce denuclearisation.  
 
While supporting stronger UN sanctions in response to North Korean WMD violations 
since 2013,3 China has kept open the economic and diplomatic channels in line with 
its commitment to denuclearisation by peaceful settlement. It has supported 
sanctions conditionally, stressing „that the measures are not intended to produce 
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negative humanitarian consequences in the DPRK, nor affect normal economic and 
trade activities‟ (Xinhua 2 December 2016). Thus China‟s strategic approach to the 
challenge posed by North Korea‟s WMD development is engagement-oriented, 
namely it seeks resolution primarily through diplomacy and economic cooperation. 
The emphasis on achieving denuclearisation without endangering „peace and 
stability‟ and through „dialogue and negotiation‟ means China‟s remains committed to 
the preservation of a stable communist regime in North Korea. It means China will 
refrain from using the strongest sanctions capable of crippling the North Korean 
economy in a very short space of time (e.g. suspension of oil exports, tight closure of 
the border to prevent all trade).  
 
This is illustrated by China‟s responses to nuclear violations by North Korea in 2009 
and 2013. The year 2009 marked a watershed as North Korea announced its 
permanent withdrawal from the Chinese-hosted SPT (i.e. rejecting the principle of 
denuclearisation) and conducted a second nuclear test. While condemning North 
Korea‟s actions and supporting sanctions in principle, China intensified diplomatic 
and economic contacts in a bid to transform North Korean behaviour. In 2013, 
following the third nuclear test and North Korea‟s constitutional commitment to 
nuclear possession, China supported UN sanctions and froze the ambitious 
investments promised during 2009-12. This set the subsequent pattern of restrained 
but incremental tightening of sanctions applied to subsequent WMD violations. While 
the growth of trade levelled off after 2014, the absolute volume of trade in 2015 (USD 
5,710 million) was still very high by recent historical standards. The frequency of 
high-level diplomatic contacts was reduced but did not cease altogether. China 
maintained its engagement-oriented strategy. 
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Drivers of China’s engagement-oriented approach 
 
China‟s engagement-oriented strategic approach is shaped by the failure of pressure 
tactics in the past. These experiences showed that strong coercive pressure or siding 
with the US only reinforced North Korea‟s inflexibility. During the early 1990s, China 
established diplomatic relations with South Korea and reduced economic support to 
North Korea in a bid to induce faster economic reform. While aggravating North 
Korea‟s economic troubles (that deteriorated into famine during 1995-8), China could 
not induce compliance. China was frozen out of the first nuclear settlement with the 
US in 1994 (Geneva Framework Agreement). Faced with North Korean collapse, 
China restored food aid without receiving warmer ties in return. High-level visits were 
suspended for seven years (1992-9).4 When China cooperated with the US over 
alleged North Korean money laundering in 2005 (by freezing North Korean accounts 
in Macau), this helped to derail the nuclear deal reached at the SPT in September 
2005, opening the way for the first nuclear test (October 2006). These experiences 
showed that if China wanted to secure North Korean cooperation, it could not be too 
tough or too biased in favour of the US. 
 
The fact that China chose to resume aid when North Korea was at its most 
vulnerable and to restore friendly relations in 1999 showed that China preferred a 
stable communist regime to collapse and uncertain transition. This has remained a 
consistent Chinese concern. To Beijing, the immediate strategic costs of economic 
collapse (e.g. desperate survival measures, North Korean factional conflict, inter-
Korean military conflict) outweigh the negatives of North Korean regime inflexibility 
(resistance to economic reform, pursuit of WMDs). Apart from strategic calculation, 
China continues to identify with North Korea to some degree as a fellow communist-
party state. Despite China‟s turn towards market economy, it still shares with North 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in The Pacific Review published by Taylor & Francis: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpre20 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23953/  
     
8 
Korea an ideological aversion to liberal-democratisation (Nosselt, 2014: 489-91). As 
the pioneer of market reform with regime preservation („mono-transition‟), China 
seeks to transfer its own model to North Korea. To Beijing, Pyŏngyang does not 
represent a lost cause. Aspects of North Korea‟s behaviour since 1999 (under both 
Kim Chŏng-Il and Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regimes) suggest potential for convergence with 
China‟s priorities. These include economic reform measures (2002-5, 2012-present), 
steady increase in two-way trade and Chinese investment (1999-2014), regular top-
level contact (1999-2011), and participation in the SPT (2003-2009).  
 
Apart from ideological alignment, China and North Korea continue to share strategic 
interests. Some scholars have identified the widening of the conventional military gap 
on the Korean Peninsula (in South Korea‟s favour) as a source of North Korean 
WMD development (e.g. Futter and Zala 2015: 375). This view is shared by the 
Chinese government, which acknowledges North Korea‟s acute sense of military 
vulnerability. Official Chinese media depict North Korean nuclear escalation as an 
understandable (but dangerously mistaken) response to perceived US military 
threats. For example, in the aftermath of North Korea‟s fourth nuclear test on 6 
January 2016, an editorial in the official Global Times newspaper (14 February 2016) 
stated: 
 
Now, as Washington's antagonistic approach has pushed North Korea further 
down the path of nuclearisation, the US, instead of making tangible moves to 
defuse the crisis, is using the escalating tension as a cover to ramp up its 
already massive military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
This statement also reveals how understanding of North Korea‟s strategic plight is 
linked to China‟s own strategic concerns about the US. Since the 2000s, some 
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Chinese policy voices (see below) have criticized the strategic orthodoxy that North 
Korea represents a „buffer zone‟ between China and US forces in South Korea. The 
leadership, however, has continued to adhere to the buffer zone understanding and 
rejects those views advocating stronger sanctions against North Korea in 
coordination with the US (Kim, H. 2010). On the contrary, North Korea‟s strategic 
importance to Beijing was reinforced when the US announced the strategy of military 
build-up in the region or „rebalance to Asia‟ in 2011 (Kelly 2014: 491-2). While North 
Korean WMD development was officially cited as one of the justifications for the 
„rebalance‟, Beijing read this as a strategy of encirclement for which North Korea 
served as one convenient pretext (of many). Given the strengthening of trilateral US-
South Korea-Japan cooperation, it was in China‟s strategic interest to preserve a 
non-hostile and viable North Korea (Park 2016).  
 
 
Dilemmas of the engagement-oriented approach 
 
China‟s engagement-oriented strategy assumes a North Korean regime capable of 
economic reform and external restraint given the right supportive environment. 
However, the protracted period of economic malaise and accelerating momentum of 
WMD development lends support to the alternative perspective that North Korea is 
incapable of following in the footsteps of China. Influential studies of North Korean 
political economy under the Kim Chŏng-Il regime (1994-2011) concluded that the 
political system was too vulnerable to accommodate serious economic reform (e.g. 
Lankov 2013). Hence official economic reform was short-lived (2002-5) (Haggard 
and Noland 2007) and subject to reversal (2005-10) (Haggard and Noland 2010: 
548-50). To compensate for its economic failings, the regime has to resort to 
international extortion by fomenting regional instability (Pollack 2011). The periodic 
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compromises with the market (e.g. acquiescence in informal markets,) and with the 
international community (e.g. proposals for dialogue) are insincere gestures aimed at 
alleviating some immediate pressure (e.g. to avert the recurrence of famine or buy 
time for WMD development) that do not mark genuine transformation of behaviour. 
The pattern established under the Kim Chŏng-Il regime has continued under the 
regime of Kim Chŏng-Ŭn (Cha 2016: 249-53). 
 
This perspective suggests a strategic response towards North Korea that places 
coercive measures over engagement. It works on the premise that the rigid North 
Korean regime would only compromise when its survival is threatened by economic 
collapse or military action. Given three abortive WMD agreements (2005, 2008 and 
2012) under two different administrations, this perspective has gained influence in 
the US. Its strongest proponents advocate the intensification of pressure on all fronts 
(deterrence, financial sanctions, human rights, lobbying of China) (e.g. Terry 2015). 
Its influence was also reflected in the hardening attitude of the recent Obama 
administration in the US (2009-17) especially after the failed Leap Day Agreement of 
2012.5 Under the doctrine of „strategic patience‟, the US took the position that North 
Korea needed to return to the 2005 and 2008 agreements as a precondition for 
further engagement, while violations would met by tougher sanctions (both UN and 
unilateral) and military counter-measures (e.g. transfer of advanced weapons to 
South Korea). 
 
This perspective suggests China is caught between „the seemingly contradictory 
goals of preventing North Korean collapse while also preventing it from becoming too 
strong‟ (Choo 2012: 108). Chinese economic input is enabling the North Korean 
regime to pursue WMD development without financial trade-off. Some Chinese policy 
thinkers support this view and consider North Korea a serious strategic liability. Its 
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land „buffer‟ offers little protection against modern warfare while any ideological 
affinity has long evaporated (North Korea‟s explicitly rejects Chinese-style 
reformism). This makes eventual collapse and absorption by the South all but 
inevitable. Supporting North Korea is damaging relations with South Korea, China‟s 
second largest trading partner, and driving it towards closer military ties with Japan. 
Above all, China‟s continued global rise depends on maintaining a cooperative 
relationship with the US (ICG 2009: 5-7; Kim, H. 2010: 61-2). Concern for North 
Korea‟s stability means that China has been „kidnapped by that much weaker 
neighbour depending on China‟s assistance‟ (Shi 2011: 360). These Chinese policy 
thinkers accord with the dominant US perspective that North Korea must first 
denuclearise if it wants peace (ICG 2009: 8).  Some US policy thinkers expect China 
to realise the benefits of a unified Korea under Seoul and discard North Korea as a 
hopeless liability (Terry 2014; Cha 2016: 259-63). 
 
 
Structure of this Discussion 
 
Table 1 summarises North Korean convergence and divergence from Chinese aims 
in the aspects of economic reform and WMD development since 1990. North Korean 
behaviour in the current (i.e. post-2009) period and its explanatory factors are 
shaded. It is set against the main features of China‟s preferred outcome of economic 
reform with WMD restraint. The post-2009 period provides the empirical focus of the 
paper because it covers the most active period of Chinese engagement (2009-13) 
and the period of nuclear escalation by North Korea (2013-present) when China 
returned to moderate sanction while keeping the economic and diplomatic channels 
open. Reviewing recent literature and data (especially from recent Chinese and 
South Korean sources), I will explain the double-edged results of China‟s 
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engagement-oriented strategy. First, I will show how Chinese trade and investment 
have facilitated North Korean economic recovery and marketisation since 2009. By 
reinforcing marketisation trends, China has realised its minimal strategic objective of 
stabilising North Korea on the basis of trade and investment (rather than aid).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Divergence on the WMD issue has persisted because Chinese economic input 
cannot satisfy the North Korean regime‟s conditions for domestic and external 
security: preservation of the monolithic system of governance and WMD-based 
deterrence that can lever diplomatic and other advantages. This raises an 
uncomfortable dilemma for China, namely, that its economic input is unintentionally 
facilitating North Korea‟s WMD development. China‟s leaders do not believe that 
crippling sanctions would accomplish WMD restraint or serve China‟s strategic 
interest. Thus they are likely to persist with a strategy of moderate sanction without 
abandoning North Korea. China‟s repeated calls for US-North Korea and inter-
Korean dialogue reveal of the limits of its own direct influence over North Korea and 
the difficulties of aligning parties (China, US, South Korea) holding very different 
visions for North Korea. 
 
 
Convergence in economic reform 
 
China intensified its efforts to transform North Korea‟s economic and political 
environment following the second nuclear test of May 2009. Premier Wen Jiabao‟s 
visit to North Korea in October 2009 signalled the start of this effort. General 
Secretary Kim Chŏng-Il reciprocated by visiting China four times in the last stage of 
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his life (2010-11). At the Hu Jintao-Kim Chŏng-Il summit of August 2010, China 
emphasised its commitment to cooperation under the principles of „government 
guidance [my italics], with enterprises playing a major role, market operation and 
mutual benefits for win-win results‟ (MOFA 2010). Trade and Chinese investment 
flourished. The two sides concluded ambitious agreements for joint development of 
two special economic zones on their border in November 2010. North Korea‟s 
economic dependence on China increased markedly from this point. 
 
North Korea‟s resumption of rocket testing in April 2012 did not undermine economic 
contacts built up during the previous three years. Chang Sŏng-T‟aek (reputed to be 
Kim Chŏng-Ŭn‟s number two) led a large delegation to China in August 2012 and put 
the finishing touches on the agreements for the special economic zones (MOFCOM 
2012). The visit reaffirmed the principles of the Hu-Kim summit of August 2010. 
Following the February 2013 nuclear test, now under Xi Jinping‟s new leadership 
team, China took a stronger line by supporting further UN sanctions (e.g. restricting 
financial transactions and illegal North Korean workers). China also suspended 
support for the special economic zones. These were halted indefinitely after the 
purge and execution of Chang Sŏng-T‟aek in December 2013. Nevertheless, 
Chinese private and local government entities continued to trade and invest, 
indicating the presence of solid commercial foundations. The rumours of oil embargo 
in 2014 were not substantiated by observed price trends. The momentum of trade 
growth was checked but there was no reduction in the value of trade. 
 
 
Key indicators of China’s impact 
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Economic relations with China have driven rapid trade growth. Figure 1 reveals the 
extent of North Korean economic dependence on China between 2000 and 2014. 
The impact of closer cooperation during the final years of Kim Chŏng-Il (2009-11) is 
evident from the leap in trade and export dependence on China (to well over 60 per 
cent). In spite of the subsequent cooling of relations, this level of dependency has 
been maintained.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Within the dependent relationship, North Korea‟s capacity to pay its way has also 
improved owing to the growth of exports to China (see trade data in Figure 2). As a 
result, North Korea‟s trade deficit as a ratio of total trade sharply declined during 
2009-11 (and remained at below 20 per cent thereafter). Another indicator of 
dependence (Figure 1) is the growth of China‟s share of total FDI stock from 1.6 
(2004) to 18.2 (2009) to 31.2 per cent (2013). The value of China‟s stock increased 
from USD 22 million (2004) to USD 262 million (2009) to USD 586 million (2013) 
(MOFCOM). As well as growth, Chinese FDI has facilitated diversification of North 
Korea‟s narrow export range. While raw materials remained the dominant export, 
manufacturing export based on textiles has been on the rise in recent years. Among 
the top five exports, the share of manufacturing increased from 26.7 per cent (2009) 
to 36.9 per cent (2014) (NSO). Chinese FDI is facilitating the emergence of export 
processing (for re-export to China) based on light manufactures. Typically, Chinese 
investors provide machinery to reactivate decrepit mines and factories using local 
labour. North Korea is remunerated for the cost of labour (manufacture) or labour 
and raw materials extracted (in mining).  
 
Figure 2 about here 
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The growth of trade driven by exchange with China has also contributed to GDP 
growth and improved living standards. South Korea‟s central bank, the Bank of Korea 
(BoK), paints a picture of sluggish North Korean GDP growth: 1.8 per cent (1999-
2004); 0.74 per cent (2004-9); and 0.73 per cent (2009-14) (NSO). This low estimate 
neglects the informal economy, the principal provider of popular livelihood since the 
famine of 1995-8 („arduous march‟). Inclusion of informal activities would probably 
add one to two percentage points to the annual growth rate (Yang 2015a). The rapid 
growth of trade since the turn of the decade would also suggest a much higher rate 
of GDP growth. Total trade (including inter-Korean trade) grew from USD 3,554 
million (2004) to USD 5,093 million (2009) to USD 9.953 (2014) (NSO). This trend 
would suggest recovery of GDP to the pre-crisis levels (when foreign trade previously 
peaked at USD 4.17 billion in 1990) (Feron 2014). Changing consumption patterns 
also suggest higher growth rates. For example, the number of mobile phone 
subscribers increased from 69,000 (2009) to 1.7 million (2012) to 3.24 million (2015) 
or 12.9 per cent of the population (NSO).  
 
 
‘Marketisation from below’: rise of the informal capitalists 
 
Ever since the famine of 1995-8, China has been North Korea‟s lifeline as the 
principal provider of consumer goods, production inputs (especially oil) and as the 
recipient of imports. As a result of the crisis, informal production and trade became 
the principal source of livelihood of the majority of North Korean citizens. Such 
„marketisation from below‟ fostered the rise of wealthy individuals or financiers known 
as tonju (literally meaning „masters of money‟). Connection with China was 
instrumental to the rise of this type of informal capitalist during the 2000s. The most 
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successful informal capitalists were those most closely involved in the importation 
and distribution of consumer goods. At the top of the commercial chain were the „big 
hands‟. These were mainly overseas Chinese (resident in North Korea) who could 
profit from their right of travel to China (Joo 2010: 124-7). Nevertheless, the regime‟s 
attitude towards informal markets during the 2000s was one of reluctant tolerance. 
Pro-market policies (2002-5) gave way to anti-market policies (2005-10), including a 
failed attempt to destroy the informal capitalists by currency redenomination in 2009. 
 
Skeptical analyses viewed the trade with China not as the advance of marketisation 
(i.e. market coordination and non-state ownership) but as the regime‟s attempt to 
achieve a highly controlled opening beneficial only to state agencies (Haggard and 
Noland, 2010: 11). The regime‟s restrictiveness meant that economic contact with 
China would not be able to sow the seeds of grassroots capitalism. A 2007 survey of 
250 Chinese firms operating in North Korea found that the North Korean state (via 
state-owned enterprises and state licensed-agents) monopolised the most profitable 
activities associated with Chinese trade and investment (Haggard and Nolan 2012). 
Apart from the North Korean state, the other principal beneficiaries were audacious, 
short-term profit-oriented Chinese entrepreneurs adept at navigating the milieu of 
high risk and bad governance (often by using bribery). The conclusion was that 
Chinese economic input was reinforcing state-controlled foreign exchange earning 
instead of nurturing non-state forms of entrepreneurship. 
 
Other studies paint a more positive picture. A more recent study (Jung and Rich 
2016) of the 2000s (2003-10) showed how the prospect of profit could offset the 
disincentive of poor institutions (legal processes, ease of communication) for 
Chinese investors. This was reflected in the continuous growth and diversification of 
Chinese FDI. The FDI data presented above shows that the FDI growth trend was 
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sustained into the 2010s (2013 being the most recently published data). Even with 
reduced Chinese government backing after 2013, the volume of trade remained 
stable, suggesting that private Chinese traders maintained their business confidence 
(Cui, 2015: 198). Reilly (2014: 903-5) observed improved business acumen among 
North Korean officials and their modification of local administrative processes to ease 
cooperation with China. Doing business with Chinese local governments and private 
agents forced North Koreans to behave in a business-like manner and live up to their 
obligations (Reilly 2014: 901-3). These accounts suggest that Chinese economic 
engagement is achieving its objective of shifting the economic interaction from aid 
towards for-profit activities that require the North Koreans to pay their own way i.e. 
become more enterprising.  
 
Has Chinese economic input helped to diffuse economic opportunity beyond the 
monopolistic agencies of the North Korean state? Increased economic exchange 
with China during the 2010s reinforced the interdependence between state 
monopolies and informal capitalists. Starting from the 1990s, when the core regime 
agencies (military, party, security agencies, cabinet) were charged with earning 
foreign exchange (for themselves and for the top leadership), they began to 
cooperate with non-state agents. This cooperation became more sophisticated 
during the 2000s. Apart from manpower (which even the vast military needed), the 
core agencies relied on informal sector funding, entrepreneurship, and marketing. 
Those state-licensed trading companies that owned no assets of their own relied on 
private traders to supply them with products for export („source mobilisation‟) and for 
distributing imports on the domestic market (Kim and Yang 2015: 43-5). On the basis 
of these needs, the China-oriented trade of the state monopolies also brought benefit 
non-state agents upon which they relied. Y-S Dong (2013: 67-8) estimated the 
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broader „merchant class‟ (i.e. „those who traded as an occupation‟) to number 
between 500,000 and one million individuals. 
 
The growth of China-oriented trade has aligned with recent top-down reforms to 
expanded opportunities for informal capitalists. The enterprise autonomy (i.e. profit 
promoting) measures (2012 and 2014) have enabled private financiers to take a 
bigger stake in the state enterprises. In this way, tonju have acquired de facto control 
of lucrative state export assets such as mines despite the official appearance of 
socialist ownership. This role can take the form of individuals managing a business 
using a state-run enterprise name („wearing the red hat‟) or individual investment in 
state-run companies while receiving interest in return (Lim 2015: 35), phenomena 
common in 1980s China (Park 2015). Far from suppressing the informal capitalists, 
the current regime appears to be actively encouraging their participation. Another 
example of the expanded role of informal capitalists is their provision of funds (and 
sub-contract labour) for much of the apartment construction boom now taking place 
in Pyŏngyang (Hong 2014: 38), one of the key people‟s livelihood measures 
associated with Kim Chŏng-Ŭn.  
 
The expanded opportunities offered by Chinese economic input is facilitating the 
collaboration between the state agents and the informal capitalists. In particular, a 
symbiotic relationship (i.e. long-term mutual interdependence) is emerging between 
the tonju and the managers of official foreign exchange assets and party funds, the 
other group that has prospered from commerce. To accumulate wealth, the tonju 
need access to official economic assets and protection (B-R Kim 2015). In order to 
preserve their wealth, the managers of state assets must also succeed commercially 
and make sufficient profit for the powerful core agencies (military and the party-state) 
to which they are responsible. The central authorities have shifted from tolerance 
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(2000s) to active encouragement (2010s) because this form of marketisation does 
not endanger the North Korean state. The rising informal capitalists seek not political 
change but political cover for their pursuit of wealth (Smith 2015: 289-90). Official 
acquiescence towards informal capitalists (tactical compromise) is turning into official 
acceptance (symbiosis). The regime is beginning to move beyond the reform-versus-
stability dichotomy. 
 
 
‘Marketisation from above’ 
 
Lacking his grandfather‟s prestige or his father‟s direct inheritance, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn 
looked to economic improvement to legitimise his succession (Park and Frank 2012). 
„Reform‟ or „marketisation from above‟ means the introduction of government 
initiatives (changes of rules, provision of financial resources) that actively support 
marketisation (i.e. market coordination and non-state forms of ownership). In his first 
public speech (15 April 2012) celebrating the centenary of national founder Kim Il-
Sŏng, he pledged that belt-tightening would never again be repeated. A document 
called „New Economic Management System in Our Own Style‟ was introduced on 28 
June 2012, outlining measures (June 28 or 6-28 measures) for giving greater 
autonomy to the agricultural and light industrial sectors. In the follow-up measures of 
30 May (5-30) 2014, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn referred to the „socialist corporate responsibility 
system‟ (Yang 2015d: 53). Economic cooperation with China has reinforced this 
motivation for reform. To finance imports from China, North Korea has had to 
upgrade its productivity. Given low profit margins on raw materials, North Korea also 
needed to diversify. The extent of reform can be illustrated by the content and results 
of policies towards agriculture and light industry, sectors where reforms began in 
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other surviving communist states. Reforms in these areas also show evidence of 
learning from previous Chinese reforms. 
 
 
‘Marketisation from above’ (1): agriculture 
 
Inspired by the 6-28 document, agricultural reforms replaced collective responsibility 
with individual household responsibility. The size of the „sub-work team‟ was reduced 
from 10-25 to 4-5 members with responsibility for a small plot of land. They also 
reduced the urban bias of socialist agriculture by ending the practice of excessive 
extraction at unfavourable prices. Instead, the urban-rural distribution of farm product 
would follow a new formula of 7 (state/urban) to 3 (farmer/rural), reflecting the urban-
rural population ratio. This contrasted with past practice when the state would collect 
a fixed quantity (rather than a ratio), often based on unrealistic expectations of 
productivity. Calculated from a more realistic baseline, the new formula would enable 
farmers to retain a greater portion of their product for sale on private markets. As in 
China, the principle of state ownership (and the corresponding responsibility to 
provide sufficient food to the state) was retained. Compared to Chinese de-
collectivisation 30 years earlier, reform proceeded more cautiously (piloted in three 
selected counties in the far northern province of Ryanggang) (Y-H Kim, 2015).  
 
Ideological commitment in the 2010s was stronger than in the 2000s (when pilots 
were terminated in October 2005). There has been no policy reverse. Indeed, Kim 
Chŏng-Ŭn reportedly said that „egalitarianism in the realm of distribution has no 
connection to socialist principles and has a detrimental impact that reduces farmers‟ 
productivity‟ (Vantage Point 2014: 27). The official media enthusiastically praised the 
performance of individual pilot farms. For example, the official Chosŏn Sinbo (a 
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Japan-based, Pyŏngyang-affiliated newspaper) (27 January 2014) claimed that 
reform led to increase in field utilisation by up to 200 per cent at the Samjikang 
cooperative farm (in the fertile South Hwanghae province) (Yang 2015c: 107-8). It 
reported the introduction of the new system throughout the country during 2013 
(Yang 2015b: 40). It was then reported that the 6 (state) to 4 (farmer) distribution 
ratio was introduced under the May 30 Measures of 2014, enabling farmers to keep 
more of their product (Y-H Kim 2015: 12-13). 
 
The last comprehensive survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization-World 
Food Programme in 2013 reported three consecutive years of strong growth in 
domestic grain production with the country returning to its highest level of food self-
sufficiency since the early 1990s (FAO-WFP 2013). While the report identified the 
persistence of widespread malnutrition (affecting 84 per cent of all households), the 
country was no longer in the grip of starvation either, a condition resembling many 
other developing countries (Smith 2016). The food balance (million tons) by 
marketing year (i.e. from November to October) showed a four-year upward trend: 
5.04 (2010-11); 5.27 (2011-12); 5.73 (2012-13); 5.93 (2013-14); and 5.94 (2014-15) 
(FAO-WFP 2013; FAO 2015 and 2016).  
 
The 6-28 and 5-30 reforms reinforced a trend of recovery that was already under way. 
North Korean farmers also made effective use of coping measures. For example, 
grain production increased in 2013 despite reduced usage of chemical fertiliser 
(owing to tighter South Korean sanctions) compared to the previous two years. This 
suggests that farmers were successfully improvising (e.g. by using human manure) 
(Lim 2014: 48) and developing resilience to sanctions. Although grain production 
went into decline in 2015-6 (to 5.42 million tons) following severe drought in various 
parts of the country during 2015 (FAO 2015 and 2016), the price of rice was reported 
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to be stable as of December 2015 (continuing a trend starting from January 2013) 
(Yang 2015a). What this suggests is that incentives and coping measures could 
alleviate but not fully offset the effects of adverse weather conditions and shortages 
of inputs. More time is needed for a definitive assessment. 
 
 
‘Marketisation from above’ (2): light industry 
 
Light industry was bedevilled by disincentives such as compulsory sale to the state at 
below-market prices, irregular supply of inputs, and the exit of workers to informal 
work. To alleviate these bottlenecks, the 6-28 measures introduced the „self-
supporting accounting system‟ that permitted enterprises to keep more of their gains 
(and take responsibility for loss). After meeting state targets, enterprises would be 
permitted to distribute remaining products at market prices to purchasers of their 
choice, both domestically and abroad (Yang 2015b: 41). They would be permitted to 
dispose of the sales revenue in the manner they wished (e.g. to supplement wages, 
make future investment). On the production side, enterprises could take more of their 
own decisions. Inputs could be sourced from the market as well as the state sector 
(thereby forcing state suppliers to compete). If enterprises used inputs sourced from 
the market, then that market dimension would also be reflected in the prices paid by 
the state („agreed price‟), in order to align state and market prices more closely 
(Yang 2015c: 111). As in agriculture, implementation began with a small number of 
pilots (five enterprises in Pyŏngyang). 
 
Here too, the ideological momentum was stronger than previously when pilot 
enterprise lasted just one year (2003-4). This time around, the authorities have 
remained very positive. The official media recognised the success of incentives in 
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boosting wages. For example, with reference to the pilot 326 Electric Wire Plant, the 
Chŏson Sinbo  (24 April 2013) claimed that the new system was „leading to an 
improvement in production performance through enhancing the motivation of the 
workers‟ while wages ostensibly increased 20-30 times between August 2012 and 
April 2013 (Yang 2015c: 111). Such generous praise reflected the authorities‟ 
increasing acceptance of profit motivation and the inevitability of income disparities. 
In a break from the past, the authorities (including Kim Chŏng-Ŭn himself) frankly 
acknowledged the deficiencies in the supply of inputs. They stressed the need to 
restore production in the key plants supplying inputs to light industry (Lee 2014: 47-
8). This reflected a shift away from the old heavy industry bias. The new tone also 
contrasted with the old propaganda-driven style of praising a particular sector‟s 
achievements before lavishing it with resources to ensure increased output (but not 
necessarily productivity). 
 
As with agricultural reform, the positive picture needs to be qualified. The „self-
supporting‟ principle applied only to a number to pilot enterprises. Even if fully 
developed, the proportion of „self-supporting‟ enterprises would only account for 
about 10 per cent of all state enterprises comprising 20 per cent of employees 
(excluding the sizeable munitions sector) (Cho 2013: 52-3). The highly publicised 
restoration of key plants supplying inputs notwithstanding, the central government 
lacked the material resources to restore production to normal levels on a broad scale 
(a necessary condition for enterprises to take full advantage of market incentives). 
Thus there has been no reported upsurge in the manufacturing utilisation ratios. 
Despite these reservations, I have shown that there is an alternative interpretation of 
the transformation of the economy (from below and above) that seems more 
consistent with the trade trends. By permitting the continuation of trade and 
investment, China has provided a benign environment (the prospect of profit by 
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entrepreneurship without great political risk to the regime) for this transformation to 
take place. 
 
 
Divergence over WMD development 
 
While converging with Chinese objectives in the aspect of economic reform, North 
Korea has not shown WMD restraint. There was a lull in WMD testing in the final 
years of the Kim Chŏng-Il regime (2010-11). From its very inception in spring 2012, 
the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime strongly affirmed its WMD commitment by launching two 
rockets within a year. After the third nuclear test (February 2013), North Korea broke 
new ground by constitutionally declaring itself as a nuclear weapons state (Nuclear 
Law of 1 April 2013). The official stance switched from denuclearisation to arms 
control („denuclearisation of the world‟). The new doctrine („line of parallel advance‟) 
envisaged the simultaneous development of the economy and WMDs. Rejecting the 
Iranian-style nuclear moratorium of 2015, North Korea accelerated its WMD 
development in 2016 by staging two nuclear tests and over 20 rocket launches. 
 
 
Explaining divergence: between US threat and Chinese restraint 
 
Chinese economic input and support for the hereditary succession could not assuage 
the North Korean regime‟s deep-rooted anxieties about its external security and 
national autonomy. At the most fundamental level, China could not compensate for 
the sense of external vulnerability vis-à-vis the vastly superior US-South Korean 
military alliance. Economic revival could not substitute for the „treasured sword‟ of 
nuclear deterrence. Possession of a proven WMD capability was associated with 
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diplomatic leverage. It would put North Korea in a stronger position to negotiate 
normalisation with the US, and perhaps end economic isolation without fully 
relinquishing WMD capability i.e. it would come to enjoy the benefits of a de facto 
nuclear weapons state (like India or Pakistan) (Cho 2014: 165). However, if the US 
chose not to engage, then North Korea would continue with its WMD development, 
and aggravate the nuclear sensitivities of close US allies South Korea and Japan. 
Like the pungsan, a Korean hunting dog that firmly grips its prey‟s weak point, North 
Korea would latch firmly onto this perceived US weakness (Chon 2014: 49).  
 
To maximise Chinese support for the impending succession, the ailing Kim Chŏng-Il 
had exercised WMD restraint (2010-11) and even negotiated the Leap Day 
Agreement (2012) with the US. Focused on consolidating a new regime, however, 
Kim Chŏng-Ŭn resumed WMD testing without being constrained by existing ties with 
China. The priority of regime consolidation over friendship with China was also 
demonstrated by the purge and execution of Chang Sŏng-T‟aek. Having a good 
rapport with China could not save Chang‟s life once his behaviour (especially his 
lieutenants‟ defiance of Kim Chŏng-Ŭn‟s direct order) was deemed incompatible with 
the Monolithic Leadership System. In resuming WMD development, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn‟s 
behaviour was consistent with those of his predecessors at the formative stages of 
their regimes, namely, reinforcement of the instruments of survival taking precedence 
over maintaining warm ties with China. For example, Kim Chŏng-Il ignored Chinese 
pressure for economic reform and instead introduced „military first politics‟ in the 
1990s while Kim Il-Sŏng‟s purged the pro-China and pro-Soviet factions and 
launched the monolithic regime in the early-1960s.  
 
Willingness to strain relations with China reveals a deeper historic trait, namely, 
rejection of stable dependence on one big power ally. North Korean regimes have 
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always pursued diversification in order to enjoy cordial relations with competing big 
powers while pivoting between them. During the Sino-Soviet dispute, Kim Il-Sŏng 
used North Korea‟s geostrategic position to obtain aid from both the USSR and 
China. With those resources, he could strengthen his domestic political autonomy 
from the big powers themselves. His successors have also pursued diversification in 
less favourable post-Cold War conditions (in which all big powers practise some form 
of capitalism). By developing WMD capability, and achieving acceptance as a de 
facto nuclear weapons state, North Korea would be able to end its international 
isolation and pivot between the US camp and China. Even if this were unachievable, 
aggravated tensions would strengthen US, South Korean and Japanese trilateral 
ties. The ensuing Chinese and Russian counter-measures could help re-create the 
quasi-Cold War triangle (Moscow-Beijing-Pyŏngyang) favoured by North Korea (Cho 
2014: 171) 
 
North Korea‟s resentment of dependence on China is deep-rooted. For example, it 
has consistently rejected Chinese proposals for reconciliation on the Korean 
Peninsula since the 1970s (Chung and Choi 2013: 253-6). Pyŏngyang viewed 
Beijing‟s diplomatic normalisation with Seoul in 1992 as an act of betrayal. When 
relations finally improved in 1999, North Korea could have chosen stable 
dependence on China but instead sought to counter-balance against China through 
economic cooperation with South Korea‟s liberal administrations (1998-2008). In his 
final years, Kim Chŏng-Il was forced into heavy economic and political reliance on 
China. His reported political testament, however, warned about the danger of 
exploitation by China (Petrov 2012). This legacy was apparent from the very 
beginning of the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime. The first overseas visit by the nominal head 
of state (Kim Yŏng-Nam) in May 2012 was to Indonesia and Singapore rather than 
China. To re-engage with Japan, North Korea established a Special Investigation 
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Committee into the abductee issue in 2014 and held several rounds of official talks, 
including a foreign minister-level meeting in August 2015. In a sign of closer ties with 
Russia, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn came close to attending Russia‟s Second World War victory 
ceremony in May 2015. 
 
 
Implications of divergence  
 
North Korea‟s lack of WMD restraint reveals a paradox at the heart of China‟s 
engagement-oriented strategy. By providing economic input, China has supported 
the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime‟s need to boost living standards but has not been 
reciprocated with WMD restraint. Far from serving as Chinese „strategic leverage‟ 
against the US (e.g. Lee 2010: 171-2), North Korea‟s WMD development has 
undermined China‟s strategic interests. Most notably, it has justified the US-South 
Korea decision in 2016 to deploy THAAD, a powerful anti-ballistic missile system. 
China has branded this deployment as an opportunistic US move threatening its 
strategic security (e.g. MOFA 15 February 2016). It has also severely strained the 
once promising China-South Korea relationship. 
 
Chinese economic input has apparently enabled the North Korean regime to pursue 
WMD development without incurring any serious financial trade-off. South Korean 
estimates (which tend to under-estimate) of North Korean government budget 
suggest continuous recovery (2009-14) despite international sanctions. The 
estimates are (billion USD): 3.7 (2009); 5.2 (2010); 5.8 (2011); 6.2 (2012); 6.8 
(2013); 7.1 (2014); and 6.9 (2015) (NSO, various issues). Analyses of North Korea‟s 
own budget data show that revenue growth to have constantly exceeded expenditure 
growth during the Kim Chŏng-Ŭn era (Frank 2016). China-North Korea trade stood at 
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USD 5,710 million (2015), diminishing but still higher than the peak of USD 5,629 
million (2011) under the Kim Chŏng-Il regime. . 
 
Contrary to Chinese expectations, Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime‟s explicit commitment to 
economic development has not diminished but reinforced the quest for WMDs. The 
regime claims that WMD development would ultimately benefit economic 
development. Its slogan of pyŏngjin nosŏn  („line of parallel advance‟) nostalgically 
harked back to a slogan used by national founder Kim Il-Sŏng half a century earlier. 
The substance of the new doctrine, however, was meant to be very different. 
Whereas Kim Il-Sŏng‟s „parallel advance‟ and Kim Chŏng-Il‟s „military-first politics‟ 
sacrificed popular livelihood for national defence, the new „parallel advance‟ (i.e. 
WMD-based defence and economic development) signalled a rebalancing of 
resources in favour of economic development. By creating a viable nuclear 
deterrence, the cost of conventional military expenditure could then be reduced (Kim, 
D-Y 2016: 59-63). Rodong Sinmun, the official Korean Workers‟ Party (KWP) 
newspaper, stated: 
 
The true excellence of the new dual-line policy lies in that it definitively 
enhances our deterrence and defence capabilities without additional spending 
on national defence, thus allowing us to focus our strength in economic build up 
and improvement of our people‟s livelihood (Kim, D-Y 2015: 76) 
 
North Korea appears to have seized on China‟s weakness. China seeks to prevent 
the worst-case scenario of a violent North Korean collapse (Dong, X. 2013: 247). 
Knowing China‟s concern with stability, the North Korean regime is emboldened to 
press on with the WMD programme confident that China will not inflict crippling 
sanctions (Shen, 2016: 865). By periodically hinting at its willingness to return to 
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multilateral dialogue, Pyŏngyang can buy further time for WMD development. The 
post-2009 Chinese approach of promoting commercial transaction over aid has also 
strengthened North Korean competitiveness. In particular, since relations cooled in 
2013, North Korea has had to pay for its imports at market prices. Although the 
volume of two-way trade is minuscule in relation to China‟s total trade, harsh 
sanctions would damage the two northeast provinces (Jilin and Liaoning) adjacent 
North Korea that the Chinese government seeks to promote.6 
 
Beijing is no doubt aware of Pyŏngyang‟s game but will probably persist with its 
restrained approach. It believes in the utility of gradually tightening sanctions without 
abandoning North Korea altogether. Recently, China announced a 10-month 
suspension (February-December 2017) of coal imports (40 per cent of total North 
Korean exports to China). This approach of pressuring North Korea without crippling 
it was praised in the official Global Times (21 February 2017): 
 
While pressing North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, the Chinese 
government has managed to maintain the survival of North Korea and never 
stopped diplomatic mediation. 
 
China maintains that North Korea‟s obstinacy over WMDs arises from a genuine 
sense of insecurity that must be addressed by direct dialogue between the main 
protagonists (US-North Korea, two Koreas). Another recent Global Times piece (22 
February 2017) stated: 
 
[The US and South Korea] should give Pyŏngyang a choice rather than 
making it believe that no matter what it does, the two will overthrow its regime 
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anyway. Engaging with Pyŏngyang isn‟t more difficult than Pyŏngyang giving 
up its nuclear ambitions. 
 
While encouraging direct dialogue, China also seeks to avoid marginalisation in the 
event of improved US-North Korea relations (as occurred in 2007-8) (Shi 2009: 40-
42). It seeks to maintain influence by restarting the SPT in Beijing. If pressured 
excessively by China, North Korea would not return to those talks. Reminding that „it 
takes two to tango‟, China emphasises shared responsibility of all parties and not just 
North Korea alone (MOFA, 7 January 2016).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This analysis highlights three important features regarding China‟s engagement-
oriented strategy in response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak 
economy, regime in pursuit of WMDs). First, China has achieved its minimal 
economic objectives of replacing aid with for-profit transactions and helping North 
Korea along the path of market reform. The Kim Chŏng-Ŭn regime has revealed itself 
to be open to marketisation while holding tightly to monolithic politics. Chinese 
economic input has reinforced marketisation trends. Second, improving economy, 
however, has provided a favourable background to the North Korean regime‟s pursuit 
of WMDs. Its commitment to achieving de facto nuclear status (as deterrence and 
diplomatic lever) appears to be resolute regardless of Chinese economic incentive or 
pressure. Third, given China‟s concerns about North Korean regime collapse and US 
encirclement, it will not align with US-South Korean calls for crippling sanctions. 
Instead, it is seeking to win other parties over to collective engagement (i.e. 
sanctions that allow for „national development‟ and openness to dialogue without 
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preconditions). In so doing, China, acknowledges that it cannot resolve the North 
Korean WMD issue by itself. To realise its strategic objective of economically viable 
and peaceful North Korea, China needs US or South Korean initiative. 
 
Since the US can end North Korea‟s international isolation and sense of insecurity, 
North Korean restraint might well follow from any US initiative. From early on, the 
recent Obama administration (2009-17) took a dim view of North Korea‟s sincerity 
(Ford 2011). Apart from the brief period leading up to the Leap Day Agreement of 
2012, the US has been reluctant to re-engage. It has ignored North Korea‟s gestures 
of compromise. For example, in January 2015, North Korea offered to suspend 
nuclear testing in exchange for suspension of the annual joint US-South Korea 
military exercises. In 2016, it referred to „denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula‟, 
indicating a shift from its typical reference to „denuclearisation of the world‟ 
(Hangyoreh 9 July 2016). For successful re-engagement, the US would need to drop 
its insistence on denuclearisation as a precondition for formal talks and accept 
denuclearisation as the outcome of a process that also addresses North Korean 
concerns (e.g. US-South Korean military exercises) (Choi and Bae 2016: 821). The 
US would have to accept the legitimacy of the North Korean regime instead of 
excoriating it over human rights. From the Chinese perspective, the US is unwilling to 
engage because the North Korean WMD issue serves the higher strategic purpose of 
containing China (Kim, H-J 2015). 
 
What about South Korean initiative? Under two conservative administrations in Seoul 
(2008-13 and 2013-present), inter-Korean relations have deteriorated to their lowest 
point since the mid-1990s. Following the logic of absorption, conservative South 
Korean administrations did not take inter-Korean cooperation very seriously. This 
was reflected in the unrealistic denuclearisation-for-aid proposal (2008)7 and the 
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suggestion of five-party talks minus North Korea (January 2016). Ironically, this 
deterioration coincided with the presence of a liberal administration in Washington. 
By contrast, the hawkish George W. Bush administration (2001-9), managed to 
agree (in principle) to comprehensive denuclearisation agreements on two occasions 
(2005 and 2008) because of encouragement from liberal South Korean 
administrations (1998-2008). Thus some argue that South Korea must take the 
engagement initiative instead of waiting for a US that is constantly distracted by 
crises elsewhere (e.g. Moon 2015). With a return to liberal politics in Seoul, South 
Korea might again be able influence the US towards re-engagement. Paradoxically, 
having all but eclipsed South Korea in terms of economic influence over the last 
decade, China‟s best hope of realising its other strategic objective of peaceful North 
Korea lies in the resumption of inter-Korean cooperation. 
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1 Understood here as nuclear weapons and systems for their delivery. 
2 By „China‟, I mean the authoritative decisions of the Foreign Policy Leading Group 
as expressed via official outlets. 
3 North Korea‟s WMD programme is subject to sanctions under five UN Security 
Council Resolutions: 1718 (2006); 1874 (2009); 2087 (2013); 2094 (2013); and 2270 
(2016). 
4 No visits by the top leader or guests received by the top leader. 
5 The agreement exchanged food in return for suspension of nuclear and missile 
testing. It collapsed when North Korea conducted a rocket test on 13 April 2012. Both 
sides accused each other of misinterpretation. 
6 For example, total trade with North Korea (January-September 2014) was USD 
2,040 million (Liaoning) and USD 840 million (Jilin). 
7 The conservative Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008-13) proposed the 
Denuclearisation, Openness, 3000 initiative (2008) requiring denuclearisation as a 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in The Pacific Review published by Taylor & Francis: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpre20 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23953/  
     
47 
                                                                                                                             
precondition of aid that would raise North Korea‟s GDP per capita to USD 3,000 
within 10 years. 
